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The Challenge of Reconciling the Competing
Principles within the Law of Foreign Investment
with Special Reference to the Recent Trend in
the Interpretation of the Term "Expropriation"
SURYA P. SUBEDI*

Summary
This article is designed to examine the tension that is emerging in jurisprudence and
state practice between the desire and need to protect the legitimate rights and expectations
of foreign investors on the one hand and the need not to unduly restrict the right of host
governments to take measures to protect the environment and human rights within the
host country on the other.
After presenting an analysis of the recent trends in the law of foreign investment, this
article demonstrates that consistency and uniformity are lacking in the interpretation of
some of the core concepts within the law of foreign investment by various international
investment law tribunals and that the present state of international law is unsatisfactory.
The manner in which the term expropriation has been interpreted variously by different
tribunals is presented as a case in point.
Accordingly, this article argues for a balancing between the rights of foreign investors
and other legitimate state concerns of flowing from international treaties concerning the
environment and human rights. In order to achieve this balance, this article argues for the
conclusion of a global comprehensive treaty on the subject matter under the auspices of
the United Nations (UN).
I. Introduction
The law of foreign investment is one of the oldest and most complex areas of international
law. Attempts have been made in the last sixty or so years, both within and outside of the
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UN, to codify and develop rules of international law in a number of areas. Consequently,
there is now a sizeable body of treaty law dealing with different areas of international
activity. But apart from the 1965 International Convention on the Settlement ofInvestment
Disputes (ICSID) Convention' that deals primarily with the procedural mechanism to settle
investment disputes, and the 1994 Trade Related Investment Measures (TRIMS) agreement
of the World Trade Organization (WTO)2 that covers only the trade related aspects of
investment measures, there is still no single comprehensive global treaty providing the
standard of treatment available to foreign investors. Most of the law of foreign investment
on the standard of treatment for foreign investors is still customary international law that
has evolved out of diplomatic exchanges, the jurisprudence of international courts and
tribunals, bilateral investment treaties (BITs), regional trade and investment treaties, and a
host of soft law instruments adopted under the auspices of the UN and its specialized
agencies.
In the absence of a comprehensive international treaty dealing with all aspects of the law
of foreign investment, reliance on the old principles of customary international law to deal
with the issues pertaining to more complex modern forms of foreign investment and associated matters has given rise to some uncertainty in the area and has thus created confusion. This is because international courts and tribunals have often offered differing interpretations of the rules of customary international law on the subject, adding to the
confusion already in existence. Similarly, various states have offered their own, and at times
contradictory, interpretations of the rules of customary international law either through
BITs or other instruments, to suit their own particular convenience.
For instance, the respective free trade agreements (FTAs) concluded by the United States
with Chile and Singapore offer an interesting insight into the practice of interpreting some
of the key principles of customary international law on foreign investment. What is interesting, however, is that in spite of concluding massive bilateral investment and trade related
treaties (such as the 1400-page long Free Trade Agreement concluded between the United
States and Singapore), these states have been unable to spell out all of the rules of foreign
investment and have thus left many matters to customary international law. The same can
be said of the Central American-Dominican Republic Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA)
concluded recently.
After witnessing various upheavals in the past fifty or so years, the law of foreign investment appears to be going through an even more interesting phase in its development. The
new interpretation of the term expropriation and the compatibility of the exercise of regulatory powers of states in favor of the public good-for instance, the protection of the
environment, with the obligations toward foreign investors under both general international law and bilateral or regional investment treaties-have come to occupy the centerstage of debate at this juncture.
Although the conditions under which a state can expropriate the assets of foreign companies and the meaning of outright expropriations has been regarded as settled, the debate

1. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States, Oct.
14, 1966, 4 I.L.M. 524 (1965). This Convention was concluded under the auspices of the World Bank in
Washington. D.C. It has been signed by 155 States and ratified by 142 States.
2. The Agreement on Trade Related Investment Measures (TRIIMs), Dec. 15, 1993, 33 I.L.M. 1 (1994).
This agreement was concluded at the end of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations in 1994
together with other WTO agreements.
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both in state practice and in legal writings concerns questions as to whether the exercise of
the regulatory or police powers of states is tantamount to the so-called creeping or other
indirect forms of expropriation.
As sovereign entities, states have undertaken obligations under various environmental
and human rights treaties. They are thus under a duty to fulfill their obligations under these
treaties. But to do so they have to take certain regulatory measures and enact laws which
may be seen as undermining the interests of foreign investors who enjoy protection under
BITs or regional trade and investment treaties. Many of the foreign investors invited to
invest in the host countries concerned may have done so to exploit lax environmental and
other standards in the country of concern. When the host states seek to raise environmental
and other standards, such measures often clash with the interests of foreign investors. Thus,
the challenge faced by the contemporary law of foreign investment at this juncture is balancing these competing principles and interests.
It is in this context that this article aims to explore the issues involved with particular
reference to the current trends in jurisprudence and state practice on expropriation. By
examining the recent trends in the area of expropriation, this article will attempt to demonstrate the rather chaotic nature of the current state of play in which various principles of
international law are competing and argue for the conclusion of a comprehensive treaty
under the auspices of the UN as a sensible way out for all concerned. In doing so, this study
will examine certain recent high-profile decisions of international investment tribunals that
seek to expand the frontiers of the concept of expropriation and those that deal with the
issue of compatibility of regulatory measures with the protection accorded to foreign investors under various bilateral and regional trade and investment treaties.

1I. Evolution of the Law and Recent Attempts to Extend the
Frontiers of Expropriation
The customary law of foreign investment has developed over the centuries in response
to changing political and economic events. The law of foreign investment has long been
the territory where the interests of various groups of states, whether between developed
and developing countries or between foreign investor or investment recipient countries,
have constantly been contested throughout the modem history of international economic
relations.
Various doctrines have been propounded by one group of states and challenged by others
to promote or defend their respective economic interests. The Hull Formulae, the Calvo
Doctrine, and the New International Economic Order are examples. The development of
the law of foreign investment and the interplay between not only law and politics, but also
law and economics, over the centuries has provided a fascinating study for scholars. One
such study is the meaning and scope of the term expropriation, both direct and indirect or
the so-called creeping expropriation.
Attempts were made within the UN in the 1970s and 1980s to adopt a comprehensive
code of conduct for transnational corporations. But when, in the early 1990s, political
and economic events overtook the efforts, the idea was abandoned. The Organization
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) tried in the late 1990s to conclude a multilateral agreement on investment (MA, but it, too, resulted in failure. Those
who criticized the MAI were concerned that it would limit the regulatory powers of
SPRING 2006
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states.' The VTO then decided to include foreign investment in its agenda for the Development Round of trade negotiations through the Doha Declaration of November
2001. In July 2004, however, this organization also decided to set aside the project. It was
too complex an area for the WTO as well because an unwieldy number of differences of
opinion among the WTO members existed as to the nature, scope, and desirability of
the conclusion of an international treaty on such a matter under the auspices of the WTO.
Once again, an all-too-familiar traditional clash of interests between the developing and
developed countries on the subject matter resurfaced during the Doha Round of multilateral
trade negotiations. This seems to have led to the virtual abandonment of the topic by the
WTO when the July 2004 Package or the Mid-Point Deal was reached in Geneva. The
main difference between these two groups of states centered around the very purpose of an
international treaty on foreign investment. While the developed or capital exporting states
wished to achieve, through the treaty, the free mobility of capital by minimizing the authority of governments with regard to the imposition of conditions and regulations on
foreign investors, the developing or capital importing countries wished to protect the autonomy of the respective governments over both investment policy and the right to regulate
the activities of foreign investors.
One of the main points of contention within the V/FO was whether an international
agreement on foreign investment should encompass portfolio investment. The principles
of the law of foreign investment have traditionally been applied to foreign direct investment-the traditional form of investment. The attempt of the developed states within the
WITO was not only to accelerate the process of liberalization of foreign investment, but
also to include a broad, asset-based definition of investment, bringing both foreign direct
investment and portfolio investment within the regime of protection available to foreign
investors. This move was resisted by the developing countries, who wished to maintain the
right to regulate portfolio investment, in particular, speculative short-term capital flows.
The proposal was to exclude altogether these investments from the definition of covered
investment that would qualify for protection under the treaty. Thus, the very definition of
the term foreign investment was a matter of controversy within the WTO and therefore
no progress could be made towards the conclusion of a treaty.
Throughout the 1990s, the developed countries tried to strengthen the position of foreign investors by restricting host countries' ability to control and regulate foreign investment through treaties, whether bilateral or multilateral, and some international tribunals
have been quick to deliver judgments to strengthen the position of foreign investors. Ar-

3. See generally P.Muchlinski, Towardsa MultilateralInvestment Agreement (MAI): The OECDand WTO Models
429, 429-51 (Friedl Weiss
and SustainableDevelopment, in, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMic LAw WITH A HuMAN FACE
et al. eds., 1998); William H. Witherell, The OECD MultilateralAgreementon Investment, TRANSNAT'L CORPS.,
Aug. 1995, at 1; Stephen Vasciannie, The Fairand Equitable Treatment Standardin InternationalInvestment Law
and Practice, 70 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 99, 99-164 (1999); Andrea Durbin, Ten Reasons to Be ConcernedAbout
the Multilateral Agreement on Investment (Nov. 1997), http://www.hartford-hwp.com/archives/25/037.html;
Martin Khor, The MultilateralAgreement on Investment (MA): Polity Implicationsfor Developing Countries, I
COOPERATION S.J. 36 (1998), availableat http://tcdc.undp.org/CoopSouh/1998- 1/cop9816.pdf; Yoshi Kodama,

The MultilateralAgreement on Investment and its Legal Implicationsfor Newly IndustrializingEconomies, 32(4) J.
WORLD T.RADE 21, 21-40 (1998); Thomas Waelde & Abba Kolo, EnvironmentalRegulation, Investment Protection
and 'Regulatory Taking' in InternationalLaw, 50 INr'L Comp. L.Q. 811, 811-48 (2001).
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4
bitral awards, such as those in the Metalad Corp., Pope & Talbot, Inc.,' and S.D. Myers, Inc.6
cases, are examples. Consequently, with the exception of certain cases such as Metbanex
Corp.,7 the trend in jurisprudence, which relies on the provisions of such regional and
bilateral treaties, appeared to go as far as to restrict the right of host states to adopt regulatory measures or exercise their police power.
Cases such as the ones just mentioned raised the possibility that the new interpretation
of the protection to which the foreign investors are entitled to under international, regional,
or bilateral law of investment may require governments around the globe to pay compensation for environmental, land use, and other regulatory measures. Concerned by such
trends, some of those very states that have long championed the rights of foreign investors
have now sought to limit to a certain extent the protection claimed by foreign investors.
The United States signaled sometime ago that it would be cautious in drafting foreign
investment protection provisions in future free trade agreements or other bilateral or regional investment treaties,' as has already been reflected to a certain extent in the two FTAs
concluded by the United States with Chile and with Singapore and especially in the
CAFTA. Moreover, the United States agreed, along with Canada and Mexico-the two
other states that are party to the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)-to
establish study commissions to consider the interpretation and possible amendment of the
NAFTA provisions on foreign investment.9 Consequently, the trend witnessed in some high
profile cases such as Metaklad Corp.10 and Ethyl Corp.," in which the regulatory powers of
states were challenged, has been tested to a certain extent in the landmark award handed
down recently by an ICSID tribunal adjudicating under NAFTA in the Methanex Corp.
case."
There is an interesting background to the tension between the regulatory powers ofstates
and the protection of foreign investors. Moving from the requirement under traditional
international law of according "fair and equitable treatment" 3 to foreign investors, the
Friendship, Commerce and Navigation (FCN) treaties concluded by the United States with
some developing states after the Second World War required "full protection and security"
to foreign investment, mainly due to various waves of outright and creeping expropriations
of the assets ofwestern companies in the developing world. The introduction of the concept
of "full protection and security" in certain FCN treaties became a norm in most BITs. The
NAFTA and some BITs added the qualifying words "as required by international law" after

4. Metalclad Corp. v. United Mexican States, 40 I.L.M. 36 (2001), (ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/97/1NAFTA 1997).
5. Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Canada (UNCITRAL-NAFTA 2001), availableathttp://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/
ma-nac/pope-en.asp.
6. S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Canada (UNCITRAL-NAFTA 2000), available at http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/
tna-nac/gov-en.asp.
7. Methanex Corp. v. U.S. (UNCITRAL-NAFTA 2002), availableathttp://www.state.gov/s/l/c5818.htm.
8. See Vicki Been & Joel C. Beauvais, The GlobalFiftb
Amendment? NAFTA's Investment Protectionsand the
Misguided Quest for an International"Regulatory Takings" Doctrine, 78 N.YU.L. REv. 30, 36 (2003).
9. See Press Release, United States Trade Representative, NAFTA Free Trade Commission: Joint Statement: "A Foundation for Future Growth" (May 28, 2002), available at http://www.ustr.gov.
10. Metalclad, supra note 4.
11. Ethyl Corp. v. Canada, 38 I.L.M 700 (1999) (UNCITRAL-NAFTA 1998); see also Todd Weiler, The
Ethyl Arbitration:Firstof its Kind and a Harbingerof Things to Come, 11 Am.Rav. INT'L ARB. 187 (2000).
12. Methanex, supra note 7.
13. See Vasciannie, supra note 3, at 99.
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the words "full protection and security" 4 Where there was no reference to international
law, the level of protection and security would be as that included in BITs or regional trade
arrangements (RTAs) that often provide a higher level of protection and security. Then,
the notions of indirect expropriation and measures tantamount to expropriation were introduced through the U.S. Model BIT by the early 1980s and were later incorporated into
the 1986 U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement. They then found their way into NAFTA.
Where the words "full protection and security" and according "fair and equitable treatment" were added, they were meant to imply that foreign investors were entitled to protection, which was more than their entitlement to non-discriminatory treatment under
international law. These are the phrases that the ICSID has employed rather generously in
favor of foreign investors in many investment cases decided in the recent past." For instance, in Metakkad Corp., the ICSID held that the decision by a local government authority
to withhold planning permission to construct a facility by Metalclad for the disposal of
hazardous waste in accordance with the agreement between the company and the Mexican
national government was regarded as a treatment that did not meet the standard of fair and
just treatment under NAFTA. 6 The award, made by the ICSID tribunal adjudicating under
NAFTA, showed how far the law of foreign investment relating to expropriation had moved
in recent years from the narrow, traditional definition of the term based on the idea of
taking foreign property to a more or less all-encompassing term:
expropriation under NAFTA includes not only open, deliberate and acknowledged takings of
property, such as outright seizure or formal or obligatory transfer of title in [favor] of the host
State, but also covert or incidental interference with the use of property which has the effect
of depriving the owner, in whole or in significant part, of the use or reasonably-to-be-expected
economic benefit of property even if not necessarily to the obvious benefit of the host State. 7
These types of awards (another being the award made in the Maffezini case 8 ) seek to
push the frontiers of expropriation beyond not only the traditional definition of taking
property, but also the so-called creeping expropriation or constructive expropriation or
deprivation advanced by the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal. These types of awards may give
rise to challenges to any governmental regulatory measures-whether they are related to
human rights or environmental protection-by foreign investors if such measures go against
their interests. Such tendencies are likely to clash with other obligations of states under
various international, environmental, or human rights treaties that may require states to
have more stringent regulatory regimes in favor of environmental or human rights protec-

14. See, e.g., North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), art. 1105, 1, Dec. 17,1992, 32 I.L.M. 289
(1993).
15. See generally Vicki Been, Does an International'Regulatory Takings' DoctrineMake Sense?, 11 N.Y.U. ENVTL.
LJ. 49, 49-63 (2002); Charles N. Brower & Lee A. Steven, Who Then ShouldJudge?: Developingthe lnternational
Rule of Law under NAFTA Chapter11, 2 CHI.J. INT'L L. 193 (2001); Garry H. Sampliner, Arbitration ofExpropriationCases Under U.S. Investment Treaties-A Threat to Democracy or the Dog That Didn't Bark?, 18(1) ICSID
REV. FOREIGN INVESTMENT LJ.. 1, 1-43 (2003); Andrew K. Bjorklund, Contract Without Privity: Sovereign Offer
and Investor Acceptance, 2 Cm. J. INT'L L. 183 (2001); Patrick G. Foy, Effectiveness of NAFTA's ChapterEleven
Investor-StateArbitration Procedures, 18(1) ICSID REv. FOREIGN INVESTMENT L.J. 44 (2003).
16. See Metalclad, supra note 4.
17. Id. 1 103.
18. Maffezini v. Kingdom of Spain, 16(1) ICSID REv. FOREIGN INVESTMENT L.J. 248 (2000) (ICSID Case
No. ARB/97/7-Argenina/Spain BIT 1997).
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tion. Indeed, after examining the consequences of the Metakiad Corp. case for host states,
Professor Vaughan Lowe rightly concludes that the award of the ICSID in this case could
encompass an enormous range of regulatory measures adopted by a State. If such measures do
indeed amount to expropriation, it follows as a necessary consequence that, unless the State
fully and promptly compensates affected businesses, it has no right to take such measures. That
19
is a very significant limitation upon the right of the State.
Citing another award made by the ICSID not long before the MetalcladCorp. award (i.e.,
20
the award made in the Santa Elena case, where the ICSID had taken a more traditional
approach, Lowe goes on to state that "[t]he gap, and the consequent uncertainty concerning
the extent of States' obligations towards investors, is a cause of real concern. Is there, one
may ask, a clear and principled approach to the determination of the limits of a State's
responsibilities?" 2'
Indeed, various other awards of the ICSID demonstrate that the ICSID often tends to
apply the law more liberally in favor of foreign investors. For instance, in the Pope & Talbot,
Inc. case, the ICSID held that "investors under NAFTA are entitled to the international
2
law minimum, plus the fairness elements," implying that NAFTA provides greater protection than that provided under international law. But this interpretation was criticized by
a Canadian Court for being an incorrect interpretation of article 1105 of NAFTA that
requires "treatment in accordance with international law, including fair and equitable treat23
ment and protection and security," implying that the fairness elements were part and parcel
24
of international law. Perhaps realizing that the ICSID tribunals were taking things bit too
far, a declaration issued by the three states party to NAFTA-Canada, Mexico and the
United States-endorsed the position taken by the Canadian Court in the following terms:
"[t]he concepts of 'fair and equitable treatment' and 'full protection and security' do not
require treatment in addition to or beyond that which is required by customary international
law minimum standard of treatment of aliens."25
Even then it is doubtful whether the leaders of these three countries were correct in their
interpretation of customary international law minimum standards. What should be noted
here is that the NAFTA provision itself goes slightly beyond what is covered by the inter-

19. Vaughan Lowe, 'Regulation or Expropriation', Lecture Delivered at the University College of London
(2003) (on file with author).
20. Compania Del Desarrollo de Santa Elena SA. v. Republic of Costa Rica, 39 I.L.M. 1317, 1330 (2000)
(ISCID 2000). It reads as follows: "[tihere is ample authority for the proposition that a property has been
expropriated when the effect of the measures taken by the State has been to deprive the owner of title, possession
or access to the benefit and economic use of his property.. . ." Id. I 77.
21. Lowe, supra note 19.
22. Pope & Talbot, Inc., supra note 5, 'I110. When making this pronouncement, the Tribunal was relying
not only on article 1105 of NAFTA, but also regarding the BITs concluded by the United States and other
industrialized states, as a principal source of the states' obligations with respect to their treatment of foreign
investment.
23. NAFTA, supra note 14, at art. 1105, T 1.
24. United Mexican States v. Metalclad Corp., [2001] 95 B.C.L.R. (3d) 169; see also Metalclad, supra note 4.
In this case, Mexico challenged the arbitration award issued by the ICSID Tribunal of August 30, 2000, and
the Canadian Court annulled in part the award of the ICSID Tribunal and revised the payment payable
thereunder.
25. NAFTA Free Trade Commission, Notes of Interpretation of Certain Chapter 11 Provisions (July 31,
2001), http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/ma-nac/NAFTA-Interpr-en.asp [hereinafter Notes of Interpretation].
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national minimum standard prescribed by classical rules of customary international law.
NAFTA is not necessarily a good example of lex generalis on the standards of treatment of
foreign investment, but an example of, like other BITs, lex specialis,agreed among the contracting parties. Although Barry Appleton of Appleton and Associates has asserted, on the
basis of the pronouncements made in cases such as Meta/dad Corp. and Pope & Talbot, Inc.,
that "a substantial part of the controversy" over the meaning of expropriation in international law "has been settled,"26 it is difficult to agree with such an assertion. The awards
made by the ICSID tribunals either under the BITs or NAFTA should be treated with
some caution as far as their implications for international law of investment are concerned.
Indeed, the trend seen in cases like Metalclad Corp. and MaffeziniP7 go somewhat beyond
the level of protection accorded to foreign investors under traditional customary international law. Accordingly, it becomes necessary to return to the provisions of international
instruments and the pronouncements of international courts and tribunals that apply lex
generalis rather than lex specialis in deciding cases submitted to them, in order to establish
the status of the rules of foreign investment. Although the views taken by other NAFTA
panels in cases before (Pope & Talbot, Inc.) and after (S.D. Myers, Inc. and Methanex Corp)
Metacladwere slightly different and much narrower in interpreting the terms expropriation
or measures tantamount to expropriation, and the panel in Metalclad itself was measured in
its interpretation of the impact of nondiscriminatory regulation on foreign investors, there
is a great deal of inconsistency in the jurisprudence of the BIT or NAFTA tribunals. Referring to the regulatory measures of the Canadian government and interpreting the provisions of article 1110 of the NAFTA Treaty, the panel in Pope & Talbot, Inc. held that it
did "not believe that those regulatory measures constitute an interference with the Investment's business activities substantial enough to be characterized as expropriation under
s

international law. 28

The panel also held that it did not regard "that the phrase 'measure tantamount to
nationalization or expropriation' in [a]rticle 1110 broaden[ed] the ordinary concept of expropriation under international law" so as to require compensation.29 Unlike the generous
view taken in the Metac/ad case, the panel held in this case that the export control regime
of Canada did not cause an expropriation of the investor's investment, creeping or otherwise. The panel went on to state that "[wihile it may sometimes be uncertain whether a
particular interference with business activities amounts to an expropriation, the test is
whether that interference is sufficiently restrictive to support a conclusion that the property
has been 'taken' from the owner." ° Thus, the panel in this case was not willing to accord
to the NAFTA provision a wider meaning than that provided for in customary international
law.
A similar view was taken in S.D. Myers, Inc.3" The panel in this case took a clear position
on the distinction between expropriation and regulatory measures:

26. Barry Appleton, Investment Disputes and NAFTA Chapter 11, Remarks at the 95th Annual Meeting of
the American Society of Int'l Law (Apr. 6, 2001), in 95 A.S.I.L. PRoc. 196 (2001).
27. See Metalclad, supra note 4; Maffezini, supra note 18.
28. Pope & Talbot, Inc., supra note 5, 96.
29. Id.
30. Id. 102.
31. S.D. Myers, Inc. supra note 6,
279-288.
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[e]xpropriations tend to involve the deprivation of ownership rights; regulations a lesser interference. The distinction between expropriation and regulation screens out most potential cases
of complaints concerning economic intervention by a state and reduces the risk that governments will be subject to claims as they go about their business of managing public affairs. 2
Also, in Feldman v. Mexico an ICSID panel did not find that the application of certain
tax laws by Mexico against the claimant were tantamount to expropriation. 3 It did, never4
theless, find that Mexico had acted inconsistently with its other obligations under NAFTA1
Indeed, due perhaps to the trend to accord rather generous interpretation to certain terms
in awards such as those in the Metakiad case, the NAFTA Free Trade Commission issued
some clarifications relating to certain provisions of NAFTA, particularly the nature and
scope of article 1105. The Commission defined the minimum standard of treatment in
accordance with international law available to foreign investors under the NAFTA provisions in the following words:
Minimum Standard of Treatment in Accordance with International Law
(1) Article 1105(1) prescribes the customary international law minimum standard of treatment
of aliens as the minimum standard of treatment to be afforded to investments of investors
of another Party.
(2) The concepts of 'fair and equitable treatment' and 'full protection and security' do not
require treatment in addition to or beyond that which is required by the customary international law minimum standard of treatment of aliens.
(3) A determination that there has been a breach of another provision of NAFFA, or of a
separate international agreement, does not establish that there has been a breach of Article
5
1105(1).3
Similarly, in OccidentalExploration & ProductionCompany v. Republicof Ecuador,Occidental,
an American company, invoked the BIT between Ecuador and the United States in a matter
36
involving non-reimbursement of VAT to the company by the Government of Ecuador.
The case was decided by the London Court of Arbitration under an UNCITRAL arbitration. 7 The company alleged that by not reimbursing VAT to them, Ecuador failed, inter
alia, to accord its investment fair and equitable treatment, treatment no less favorable than
that required by international law, and expropriated, directly or indirectly, all or part of its
investment in violation of the internationally accepted norms of the treatment of foreign
investment.38 Using the narrower criterion of substantial deprivation under international law
identified in Pope & Talbot, Inc., the Tribunal dismissed Occidental's claim of expropriation.3 9
Nevertheless, other ICSID cases dealing with the issue of full protection and security
provided to foreign investors under BITs from the host state have raised controversy as to
the meaning and scope of this phrase. In some cases the ICSID panels have interpreted this

32. Id. 282.
33. Marvin Feldman v. Mexico, 42 I.L.M. 625, 669 (2003) (ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/99/1-NAFTA
2002).
34. See id.
35. Notes of Interpretation, supra note 25, para. B.
36. Occidental Exploration and Production Co. v.The Republic of Ecuador (LCIA Case No. UN 3467United States/Ecuador BIT 2004), available at http://www.investmentclaims.com/oa l.html.
37. See id.
38. See id. %%1-24.

39. Id.

78-92.
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phrase rather generously-under it, host governments may one day be expected to deploy
the police for the protection of foreign investors free of charge in the event of civil strife
and armed insurgence within the country. As stated by Professor Andreas Lowenfeld, "BITs
seem to require the government of the host State not only not to attack the facilities or
personnel of the investor, but to defend the investor or investment against others, including,
for instance, rebel forces." 40 Indeed, in the Asian Agricultural ProductsLtd. v. Republic of Sri
Lanka case, an ICSID tribunal established Sri Lanka's state responsibility for failing to take
the appropriate precautionary measures to protect the interests of Asian Agricultural Products, a British company conducting business in an area where fighting was taking place
1
between the government and rebel forces.4
To distinguish between mere regulatory measures and those constituting expropriation,
the three-part test prescribed by the U.S. Supreme Court in the landmark case of Penn
Central TransportationCo. v. New York City4 is illustrative. The court explained that, in order
to establish whether a regulatory measure was tantamount to expropriation, that measure
has to be examined against the following three items: (1) the economic impact of the regulation on the claimant; (2) the extent of interference with the property owner's reasonable
investment-backed expectations, and (3) the character of the government action.43 Although
this municipal law case has not been cited openly as a source of authority by international
courts and tribunals, this three-part test seems to have had a measure of influence in the
legal literature. Of course, article 1114(1) of NAFTA preserves the police powers of states
in the following words: "Nothing in this [c]hapter shall be construed to prevent a Party
from adopting, maintaining or enforcing any measure otherwise consistent with this [c]hapter
that it considers appropriate to ensure that investment activity in its territory in undertaken
in a manner sensitive to environmental concerns." 44
Thus, it seems to be agreed that only if the regulatory measure in question interferes
with the investor's legitimate and reasonable expectations in making the investment does
40.
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476 (Oxford University Press, (2002)).

41. Asian Agricultural Products, Ltd. v. Republic of Sri Lanka, 30 I.L.M. 577 (1991) (ICSID Case No.
ARB/87/3 -United Kingdom/Sri Lanka BIT 1990).
42. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
43. Delivering the judgment of the Court, Justice Brennan outlined his views in the following words:
The question of what constitutes a "taking" for purposes of the Fifth Amendment has proved to be a
problem of considerable difficulty. While this Court has recognized that the "Fifth Amendment's guarantee ...[is]
designed to bar Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens
which, in all fairness and justice, should be home by the public as a whole" this Court, quite simply,
has been unable to develop any "set formula" for determining when "justice and fairness" require that
economic injuries caused by public action be compensated by the government, rather than remain
disproportionately concentrated on a few persons. Indeed, we have frequently observed that whether
a particular restriction will be rendered invalid by the government's failure to pay for any losses proximately caused by it depends largely "upon the particular circumstances [in that] case" In engaging in
these essentially ad hoc, factual inquiries, the Court's decisions have identified several factors that have
particular significance. The economic impact of the regulation on the claimant and, particularly, the
extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations are, of
course, relevant considerations. So, too, is the character of the governmental action. A "taking" may
more readily be found when the interference with property can be characterized as a physical invasion
by government, than when interference arises from some public program adjusting the benefits and
burdens of economic life to promote the common good.
Id. at 124 (internal citations omitted).
44. NAFTA, supra note 14, at art. 1114(1).
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it constitute expropriation. Regulations that impose general limitations on the activities of
the investors to protect the general interest of the public would not be regarded as expro-

priation. In addition, the regulatory measures in question have to be subjected to other
tests, including proportionality.
H. Lex Genaralis v Lex Specialis
The attempts by certain ICSID tribunals to exploit the nexus between BIT provisions
and the doctrine of state responsibility in order to provide the maximum protection possible-over and above what is accorded under customary international law to foreign investors-are seeking gradually to transform the rules of lexspecialis character to lex generalis
character, thereby changing the law of foreign investment in accordance with the factual
realities of the changing world. For instance, although it is submitted that the primary
obligation under the NAFTA provisions on foreign investment is to accord treatment to
foreign investors in accordance with international law, in general, and the minimum standard of treatment, in particular, the attempts on the part of the developed countries, the
ICSID, and the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunals have often been to stretch both the law and
the meaning of the minimum standard beyond reasonable limits in order to deliver the
results desired by the investor countries.
Although some ICSID tribunals have taken a more traditional approach in cases such as
S.D. Myers, Inc. and Pope & Talbot, Inc., the trend seen in Metak/ad may be invoked by future
tribunals. As discussed earlier, in S.D. Myers, Inc., the tribunal took the view that expropriation normally constitutes a taking of property with a view towards transfer of ownership
and no expropriation was found in this case. Likewise, although the tribunal in Pope dr
Talbot, Inc. held that regulatory measures could constitute expropriation, it did not find that
expropriation had taken place in this case either. Similarly, in SGV v. Philippines,4 the
tribunal did not regard non-payment of invoices by the Philippines as constituting expropriation. Nevertheless, in advancing the analysis made by the tribunal in this case, another
ICSID tribunal, in Feldman v. Mexico, found that the application of certain tax laws by
Mexico to the export of tobacco products by a company owned and controlled by an American citizen amounted to a violation of NAFTA article 1102 and awarded compensation to
the company.Nevertheless, given the limited significance of the provisions of BITs and the decisions
of the ICSID and Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunals, it is doubtful whether this new trend has
already altered the central tenets of the traditional law of foreign investment. For instance,
the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal was required to consider cases of not only expropriation but
also of other measures affecting property rights. It is difficult to establish whether a particular award of the Tribunal was based on the application of the established or settled principles of international law of foreign investment or on its broader jurisdiction allowing it
to consider cases involving other measures affecting property rights. The political background to the Tribunal, its ad hoc character resembling a factual inquiry, and the peculiar
factual situation of the cases considered by the Tribunal, do not allow its awards to command

45. SGV v. Philippines, %161 (ICSID Case No. ARB/02/6-Switzerland/Philippines BIT 2004), available
at http://www.investmentclaims.com/oa 1.html.
46. Feldman, supra note 33, T 108.
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the same authority as do the judgments of other truly international courts and tribunals
such as the International Court ofJustice (ICJ). Until it can be established that these central
tenets have been modified by new state practice, the traditional customary international law
remains valid.
Of course, while customary international law is constantly evolving and new examples of
state practice are liable to change the existing rules, such new practices should, nevertheless,
meet other criteria, including consistency, generality, and uniformity, before they can alter
the existing rules. Although an arbitration tribunal held recently that insofar as the application of customary international law rules to NAFTA disputes was concerned, the term
customary international law "refers to customary international law as it stood no earlier
than the time at which NAFTA came into force,"' 7 what the tribunal was referring to was
perhaps local, regional, or special customary international law as opposed to general customary international law. The law developed by NAFTA is not ipso facto capable of altering
the meaning, nature, and scope of general customary international law.
Because of the attempts to interpret the NAFTA and other BIT provisions in a manner
which is favorable to investors and rather restrictive to sovereign states so as even to limit
the so-called police powers of states, there has been a move recently to counter these
attempts by stating that when interpreting the NAFTA provisions, reliance must be laid
on the customary international law of foreign investment; the protection that NAFTA
provides is not over and above what customary international law provides. 48 Indeed, in some
recent cases decided by ICSID there has been an attempt to accord a narrow meaning to
the terms full protection and security rather than a broad one. For instance, in the Asian
AgriculturalProductscase the ICSID tribunal, held that "'[t]he State into which an alien has
entered.., is not an insurer or a guarantor of his security .... It does not, and could hardly
be asked to, accept an absolute responsibility for all injuries to foreigners.'" 49 The ICJ too
was reluctant in the ELSI case to accord a broad meaning to the terms full protection and
security.50
These developments indicate that international courts and tribunals are perhaps willing
to accept that states can exercise their regulatory powers or police powers to impose certain
reasonable restrictions on foreign investors. The comments to the Restatement Third on
Foreign Relations Law provides that "[a] State is not responsible for loss of property or
other economic injury that is due to bona fide general taxation, regulation, forfeiture for
crime, or other action of the kind that is commonly accepted as a within the police power
of States."' The developed countries, however, have supported investors as long as they
were initiating legal proceedings against the regulatory powers of developing countries, but
when the investors began to challenge the regulatory powers of the developed countries
themselves there was a shift in attitude in these countries. The following observations of
47. Mondev International Ltd v. United States, 42 I.L.M. 85 (2003), 125 (ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/99/
2-NAFTA 2002).
48. For instance, in a statement the Government of Canada described the limits of article 1105 in the
following terms: "[a]rticle 1105, which provides for treatment in accordance with international law, is intended
to assure a minimum standard of treament of investments of NAFTA investors... this article provides for a
minimum absolute standard of treatment, based on long-standing principles of customary international law
....
"Canada Gazette, Part I, January 1, 1994, at p.149 (on file with author).
49. Asian Agricultural, supra note 41, 49.
50. Elettronica Sicula S.P.A.
(ELSI) (U.S. v. Italy), 1989 I.C.J. 15 (July 20), 28 I.Ld.. 1109 (1989).
51. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATiONS LAw OF THE UNITED STATES, § 712, cmt. g (1987).
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Gary Sampliner with regard to the shift in attitude on the part of the United States and
Canada in relation to the rights of implications of the investment protection provisions of
NAFTA are noteworthy:
The right of foreign investors to proceed directly to arbitration against their host States under
investment treaties for alleged expropriation has received increasing attention in recent years.
Although the United States has entered into such treaties [i.e., BITs] for more than two decades,
significant controversy about this right has only arisen since the first cases under the investment
chapter of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) were filed against the United
States and Canada in the late 1990s. It was only at that point that the realization hit home in
the United States and other developed countries that these investment treaties, thought necessary to address disputes with developing country governments, could be used by foreign
investors in developed countries to challenge a wide variety of national and sub-national
actions.5 2
Indeed, the provisions of the U.S. Trade Act of 2002 concerning the future direction of
the protection of foreign investment within the United States are noteworthy. Providing
guidance as to the future course of action on the matter, the Act states that
(3) Foreign investment.-Recognizing that United States law on the whole provides a high
level of protection for investment, consistent with or greater than the level required by
international law, the principal negotiating objectives of the United States regarding
foreign investment are to reduce or eliminate artificial or trade-distorting barriers to
foreign investment, while ensuring that foreign investors in the United States are not
accorded greater substantive rights with respect to investment protections than United
States investors in the United States, and to secure for investors important rights comparable to those that would be available under United States legal principles and practice,
by(A) reducing or eliminating exceptions to the principle of national treatment;
(B) freeing the transfer of funds relating to investment;
(C) reducing or eliminating performance requirements, forced technology transfers,
and other unreasonable barriers to the establishment and operation of investments;
(D) seeking to establish standards for expropriation and compensation for expropriation,
consistent with United States legal principles and practice;
(E) seeking to establish standards for fair and equitable treatment consistent with Untied States legal principles and practice, including the principle of due process;
(F) providing meaningful procedures for resolving investment disputes;
(G) seeking to improve mechanisms used to resolve disputes between an investor and a
government through(i) mechanisms to eliminate frivolous claims and to deter the filing of frivolous
claims;
(ii) procedures to ensure the efficient selection of arbitrators and the expeditious
disposition of claims;
(iii) procedures to enhance opportunities for public input into the formulation of
government positions; and
(iv) providing for an appellate body or similar mechanism to provide coherence to
the interpretations of investment provisions in trade agreements; and
(H) ensuring the fullest measure of transparency in the dispute settlement mechanism,
to the extent consistent with the need to protect information that is classified or
business confidential, by-

52. Sampliner, supra note 15, at 1.
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(i) ensuring that all requests for dispute settlement are promptly made public;
(ii) ensuring that(1) all proceedings, submissions, findings, and decisions are promptly made
public; and
(11) all hearings are open to the public; and
(iii) establishing a mechanism for acceptance of amicus curiae submissions from busi53
nesses, unions, and non-governmental organizations.

This demonstrates that while the United States would continue to seek greater protection
for its investors abroad than the protection available to domestic investors in the host
countries, it would not accord any greater protection to foreign investors in the United
States than that available to U.S. investors in the United States.
If other states were to emulate this U.S. practice the world would perhaps in effect be
witnessing the revival of some of the elements of the Calvo Doctrine. What the U.S. legislation is trying to do is to accord national treatment to foreign investors. One of the
central elements of the Calvo Doctrine was designed to do precisely this-in other words,
to accord national treatment to foreign investors. After challenging this doctrine for so
long, the United States seems to be embracing the idea for different reasons. One reason
given for this change was that there was a tendency on the part of certain NAFTA tribunals
or at least on the part of certain claimants before these tribunals to interpret the term
expropriation too broadly so as to challenge many regulatory measures of the United
States. 4 Consequently, some of the FTAs concluded by the United States since the enactment of the Trade Act of 2002 have sought to limit the scope of the term expropriation
and protect the regulatory measures or the police powers of the United States. Indeed, as
stated by Noah Rubins, "(t)he realization that international law is a two-way street has
engendered sharp political pressure in Canada and the United States to scale back the power
of NAFTA tribunals-a campaign that may lead to additional challenges of NAFTA
awards.""s
Furthermore, with a view to imposing a constraint on NAFTA or ICSID tribunals, states,
including the United States, have introduced the idea of appeal against the awards of such
tribunalsY6 For instance, the U.S. Model BIT and the Central American Free Trade Agreement envisage an appellate system for investment disputes."s The U.S-Chile and U.S.53. Trade Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-2 10, § 2102(b)(3), 116 Stat. 933, 995 (2002).
54. See S. Rep. No. 107-139, at 13-15 (2002).
55. Noah Rubins, JudicialReview of Investment Arbitration Awards, in NAFTA INVESTMENT

LAW AND

ARBI-

TRATION: PAST ISSUES, CURRENT PRACTICE, FUTURE PROSPECTS, 359, 362 (Todd Weiler ed., 2004).

56. See William H. Knull, I & Noah D. Rubins, Betting the Farmon InternationalArbitration:Is it Time to
Offer an Appeal Option?, 11 (4) Am. REV. INT'L L. REv. 531, 531-646 (2000).
57. Outlining the U.S. objectives for future negotiations on investment agreements, a report of the Committee on Finance of the US Congress on the Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act of 2002 states that
the US negotiators
should seek to establish a single appellate body to review decisions in investor-state disputes. As the
United States enters into more investment agreements and the number of investor-state disputes grows,
the need for consistency of interpretation of common terms-such as expropriation and fair and equitable treatment-will grow. Absent such consistency, key terms may be given different meanings
depending on which arbitrators are appointed to interpret them. This will detract from the predictability of rights conferred under investment agreements. A single appellate mechanism to review the
decisions of arbitral panels under various investment agreements should help to address this issue and
minimize the risk of aberrant interpretations.
S. Rep. No. 107-139, supra note 54, at 16.
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Singapore FTAs also allow for this possibility. What is also equally interesting is the absence
5
of any investment dispute settlement mechanism in the U.S-Australia FTA. This also
represents an indirect revival of some of the elements of the Calvo Doctrine under which
investment disputes with foreign investors were supposed to be entertained by the domestic
59
courts.
IV. Recent Trends under the FTAs
The FTAs are the new breed of ambitious bilateral treaties that seek not only to regulate
in as much detail as possible the rules governing trade and investment relations between
the parties concerned, but also to influence the development of the law at the international
level through their practice. They also seek to provide guidance to future investment dispute
settlement tribunals as to how some of the key principles of the law of foreign investment
should be interpreted. Indeed, a report produced by a committee of the U.S. Congress
points to the need for clarity in the various principles and key terms of the law of foreign
investment and instructs U.S. negotiators to seek, inter alia, to establish in future negotiations on foreign investment agreements standards for expropriation and for fair and equitable treatment consistent with the U.S. legal principles and practice, including the prin6
ciple of due process. 0 Accordingly, the FTA agreements concluded by the United States
with Singapore provide in an annex that "(a)n action or a series of actions by a Party cannot
constitute an expropriation unless it interferes with a tangible or intangible property right
61
or property interest in an investment." The agreement speaks of two types of expropriations, direct and indirect. An indirect expropriation is an action or series of actions by a
Party that have an effect equivalent to direct expropriation without formal transfer of title
or outright seizure. The agreement goes on to outline the nature of indirect expropriation:
(a) The determination of whether an action or series of actions by a Party, in a specific fact
situation, constitutes an indirect expropriation, requires a case-by-case, fact-based inquiry that considers, among other factors:
(i) the economic impact of the government action, although the fact that an action or
series of actions by a Party has an adverse effect on the economic value of an investment, standing alone, does not establish that an indirect expropriation has
occurred;
(ii) the extent to which the government action interferes with distinct, reasonable
investment-backed expectations; and
(iii) the character of the government action.
(b) Except in rare circumstances, non-discriminatory regulatory actions by a Party that are
designed and applied to protect legitimate public welfare objectives, such 62as public
health, safety, and the environment, do not constitute indirect expropriations.

58. Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Austi., May 18, 2004, available at http://www.dfat.gov.au/trade/negoiations/
us-fta/final-text/index.html.
59. Indeed, both Brazil and Argentina were reported to have stated that that they would not agree to the
investor-to-state arbitration dispute settlement mechanism in the future Free Trade Agreement of the Americas.
60. See generally S. Rep. No. 107-139, supra note 54.
61. Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Sing., Jan. 15, 2003, Side Letters-Exchange of Letters on Expropriation
(Letter from Robert B. Zoellick, United States Trade Representation, to George Yen, Minister for Trade and
Industry (May 6, 2003)), available at http://www.sice.oas.orgfTrade/USA-Singapore/USASingind-e.asp.
62. Id.
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Thus, such provisions were designed to provide additional guidance about how the term
expropriation should be interpreted in the future. Such provisions would limit the freedom
of ICSID or other tribunals to interpret the term expropriation broadly whereby any regulation that reduces corporate profits or value could not be interpreted as a creeping or other
form of expropriation. 63 The U.S.-Singapore Agreement goes on to spell out the understanding of the parties about the nature and scope of customary international law applicable
to foreign investment. In another annex, it reads: "customary international law results from
a general and consistent practice of States that they follow from a sense of legal obligation." 4 The statement with regard to the Minimum Standard of Treatment is also interesting. It reads: "the customary international law minimum standard of treatment of aliens
refers to all customary international law principles that protect the economic rights and
interests of aliens."6s This is a much broader statement and begs more questions as to the
nature and scope of not only the economic rights, but also the interests of aliens under
international law.
Although the provisions of agreements such as these would have a tremendous impact
on the development and interpretation of customary international law on foreign investment in the future, it is difficult at this stage to maintain that what the United States has
agreed to with Chile and Singapore is an accurate reflection of the status of customary
international law. As with the BITs, the FTAs are also lex specialis in character. Of course,
examples of lex specialismay in due course transform themselves into lex generalis,yet there
is no convincing evidence to suggest at this stage that this has already taken place.
Furthermore, there is the fact that the draft MAI designed to bolster the trend witnessed
in the BITs could not attract enough support for its adoption. It could be argued that there
is no universal support for the provisions providing for the level of protection for foreign
investors to be found in the BITs or RTAs. Dissatisfied with its own previous voluntary
code of conduct, and encouraged by the 1992 Guidelines of the Joint Development Committee of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, the OECD had sought,
once again, to conclude a MAI in 1998. A report of the OECD on the MAI stated that the
agreement was "needed to respond to the dramatic growth and transformation of foreign
direct investment (FDI) which has been spurred by widespread liberalisation and increasing
competition for investment capital."66
The aim of the proposed agreement was to ensure that the liberalization obligations of
states were complemented by provisions on investment protection and reinforced by effective dispute settlement procedures. The goal of the MAI was to "set high standards for the
treatment and protection of investment" and "go beyond existing commitments to achieve
a high standard of liberalisation." 7 Accordingly, article Ill of the draft MAI contained the
following provisions regarding the treatment of investors and investments:
63. See Been & Beauvais, supra note 8, at 30.
64. Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Sing., Jan. 15, 2003, Side Letters-Exchange of Letters on Customary
International Law (Letter from Robert B. Zoelick, United States Trade Representation, to George Yeo, Minister for Trade and Industry (May 6, 2003)), available at http://www.sice.oas.orgFTrade/USA-Singapore/USA
Singind-e.asp.
65. Id.
66. See Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, Multilateral Agreement on Investment:
Documentation from the Negotiations, http://www.oecd.org/daf/mai/htm/cmitcime95.htn (last visited Feb. 3,
2006).
67. Id.
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1. Each Contracting Party shall accord to investors of another Contracting party and to
their investments, treatment no less favourable than the treatment it accords [in like
circumstances] to its own investors and their investments with respect to the establishment, acquisition, expansion, operation, management, maintenance, use, enjoyment and
sale or other disposition of investments.
2. Each Contracting Party shall accord to investors of another Contracting Party and to
their investments, treatment no less favourable than the treatment it accords [in like circumstances] to investors of any other Contracting party or of a non-Contracting Party, and
to the investments of investors of any other Contracting Party or of a non-Contracting
Party with respect to the establishment, acquisition, expansion, operation, management,
68
maintenance, use, enjoyment and sale or other disposition of investments.
On the protection of investment, draft article TV made a provision in favour of foreign
investors:
1. General Treatment
1.1 Each Contracting Party shall accord to investments in its territory of investors of
another Contracting Party fair and equitable treatment and full and constant protection and security. In no case shall a Contracting Party accord treatment less [favorable] than that required by international law.
1.2. A Contracting Party shall not impair by [unreasonable or discriminatory] [unreasonable and discriminatory] measures the operation, management, maintenance, use,
enjoyment or disposal of investments in its territory of investors of another Con69
tracting Party.
Thus, the draft MAI contained better provisions than those under the 1992 World Bank
guidelines in favor of foreign investors, yet stipulated little on the conduct of foreign investors themselves. Therefore, critics described the draft MAI of the OECD as a Global
Bill of Rights for foreign investors.70 It was seen in some quarters as an instrument "based
largely on the assumption that capital has little or no social obligation in the new global
economy."" It was argued that virtually all the rights were given to foreign-based corporations while the obligations were imposed on host governments. The draft MAI was criticized as being an attempt to allow the transnational corporations (TNCs) to regulate States,
rather than the reverse. Some of the underlying concerns behind such criticism stemmed
from the desire to protect the regulatory powers of states, whether for the protection of
the environment or human rights or workers rights.7 2 Consequently, the OECD had to
abandon the draft MAI and adopt a revised set of guidelines in the form of a soft law
instrument. 3

68.

ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, THE MULTILATERAL AGREEMENT ON

INVESTMENT: THE MAI NEGOTIATING TErr, art.

m

(Apr. 24, 1998), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/

46/40/1895712.pdf.
69. Id. at art. W
70. See, e.g., United Nations, Focus on Freshwaterand the Role of Industry,
28(3-4) ENVTL. PoL'v L. 116, 129
(1998).
71. Id.
72. See, e.g., Durbin, supra note 3; Khor, supra note 3; Waelde & Kolo, supra note 3.
73. After failing in its attempt to adopt a legally binding MAI, the OECD adopted a set of revised guidelines
for multinational enterprises in 2000. See ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT,
THE OECD GUIDELINES FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES (June 27, 2000), available at http://www.oecd.org/

dataoecd/56/36/1922428.pdf. The old OECD Guidelines can be found in an OECD publication, THE OECD
GUIDELINES FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES

(1997).
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V. The Way Forward
As seen in the analysis presented above, throughout the centuries, the law of foreign
investment has evolved in response to both economic and political realities of the world. It
was the developing countries that sought in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s to regulate foreign
investment through an international instrument rather than leaving the matter to inter7
national customary law. 4 The idea was to impose certain conditions on foreign investors,
including TNCs, requiring them to use local raw material, to employ local people, and to
refrain from interfering in the internal affairs of the host states, among other duties. But
in the 1990s these very developing countries became reluctant to support the idea of regulation of foreign investment under the auspices of the WTO. When the developing countries sought to regulate foreign investment under the auspices of the UN, many developed
countries resisted the attempt, perhaps fearing that such an international instrument would
be more in the interests of host states than the home states.
But when an attempt was made through the OECD to adopt an international agreement
on foreign investment, the developing countries were opposed to it, fearing that the instrument would be in the greater interest of home states than of the host states. This is also
the reason why many developing countries were opposed to the regulation of foreign investment under the auspices of the VVTO. These very developing states, however, have
been forced to accept the rulings of international investment tribunals, such as the ICSID,
which have mainly applied standards favored by the developed states and foreign investors.
This anomaly could be addressed by the conclusion of an international treaty on foreign
investment that is as balanced and as fair as possible for both investors and investment
receiving countries.
Thanks to globalization, neither the host nor home countries are able to regulate or
control the activities of foreign investors in general and the TNCs in particular. While the
people in developing nations are concerned about violations of human rights and degradation of the environment by the TNCs, the people in the developed countries are concerned that TNCs are relocating or outsourcing their business operations to developing
countries in order to avoid tax, to escape from environmental compliance and other regulatory regimes, to exploit cheap labor, and to pursue profit at the expense of other responsibilities. The interests of both developed and developing countries seem to be converging
gradually towards the adoption of an international agreement to regulate foreign investment. What is required is balancing the interests of both host and home countries.
In the absence of a global treaty, the law of foreign investment has remained as controversial as before. Some of the core principles relating to expropriation and the meaning
and scope of compensation terms such as just, adequate, full, prompt, effective, equivalent,
and fair, as well as the concepts of the due process of law, fair and equitable treatment, and
full protection and security, have been applied in varying degrees by international courts
and tribunals since there is still no internationally agreed definition of these terms. Furthermore, neither BITs, RTAs, nor jurisprudence provide clear guidance as to the distinction between legitimate non-compensable regulations having an effect on the economic
value of investments, on the one hand, and the so-called regulatory takings requiring com-

74. See Nico Schrijver, Developments in InternationalInvestment Law, inEsSAYS
703, 720 (Ronald St. J. Macdonald ed., 1994).
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pensation on the other. In the absence of clarity, the ICSID panels have further muddied
the water and compounded the problem.
In order to address the problems outlined in the preceding paragraphs, it is apparent that
a global treaty on the subject is needed. Such a treaty would steer the development of the
law of foreign investment in the direction of being able to respond to the challenges brought
about by the increasingly interdependent and interconnected world where one area of law
produces direct implications for another area of law. The task of negotiating such a treaty
should be entrusted to an international organization that is capable of balancing competing
interests, and the WTO is a good candidate for this purpose. But the WTO is an organization established primarily to liberalize international trade and ultimately the regime of
foreign investment too. The institutional and philosophical framework of this organization
may not allow it to pay adequate attention to other issues, such as the environment and
human rights, when regulating foreign investment. Furthermore, the WTO is a relatively
small organization that already has a very heavy trade agenda. The current challenge for
this organization is to make one of the most ambitious rounds of trade negotiations, i.e.,
the Doha Development Round, a success. The law of foreign investment is too complex an
area for such a busy trade organization. Therefore, the most obvious organization for this
purpose is the UN. The General Assembly of the UN could create a body such as the
Commission on Sustainable Development for negotiation of an international treaty on
foreign investment.
Once a global treaty is concluded, the task of settling investment disputes under it could
be entrusted to a permanent investment court or tribunal or to existing institutions such as
the dispute settlement body (DSB) of the WTO or ICSID, but in the absence of such a
treaty, these institutions lack the ability, due to their inherent limitations, to develop a
balanced jurisprudence to address the problems outlined in this study. The business of
developing the law of foreign investment is too important an area to be left to some ad hoc
tribunals established under the ICSID or UNCITRAL. There is a need for a global treaty
on the regulation of foreign investment, and the UN is an appropriate body to negotiate
such a treaty. It is better for both developed and developing states to adopt an international
instrument to manage a fundamental change that is taking place in the area of foreign
investment through the UN rather than to leave it entirely to the market forces.
The International Law Commission would have been another appropriate agency to
develop such a treaty. But since its approach is legal and all of its members are international
lawyers, it is perhaps not well equipped to develop a comprehensive treaty on the regulation
of foreign investment dealing with both the legal and economic issues. It is, of course, well
placed to develop and define the hard-core traditional principles of the law of foreign
investment, but not necessarily suitable for a comprehensive treaty on foreign investment.
In order to negotiate such a comprehensive treaty, it is necessary to have people with
expertise, not only in international law, but also in economics, finance, trade, and business.
Furthermore, it was clear during the OECD negotiations on the MAI that the contribution
of the international non-governmental/non-governmental organizations (INGO/NGOS)
and other civil society organizations to such negotiations would be very helpful in concluding a balanced treaty and there are hundreds, if not thousands, of such organizations
that would be interested in making a contribution. No small organization such as the ICSID, the WTO DSB, or the International Law Commission (ILC) would be able to handle
such a situation. Therefore, the UN would be the more appropriate organization for this
purpose.
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Unlike the OECD, the UN has a global view of things. While some agencies of the UN
are doing their job in promoting human rights and protecting the environment, others are
promoting the ideas behind economic growth, development, economic efficiency, and more
openness in economic activities etc. The UN is well placed to accommodate all of these
issues when negotiating a treaty on foreign investment. Various UN agencies working in a
diverse range of areas would be able to feed to the work of another UN agency working in
the area of foreign investment. It is bound to be more inclusive and more sensitive to other
legitimate concerns when negotiating such a treaty. The WTO, the OECD, and the UN
all realize the importance of foreign investment to developing countries and the need for
a stronger protection for foreign investors doing business abroad, especially in those countries which are unstable politically, socially, and economically. The UN is likely to be more
capable of engaging in the balancing act than other organizations since it can draw on its
experience in the area of both human rights and the environment, as well as in corporate
responsibility.
VI. Conclusions
As discussed earlier, the term 'expropriation' or 'measures tantamount to expropriation'
or 'indirect' or 'creeping expropriation' has been interpreted variously by different ICSID,
UNCITRAL, and Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunals. The outcome in the Methanex Corp. case
demonstrates that there is an inclination in jurisprudence towards striking a balance between
the rights of foreign investors and the regulatory powers of states. The tribunal in this case
rejected some of the findings in the Metalclad Corp. case. Two different decisions of two
arbitral tribunals in similar circumstances, however, are not new in the world of arbitration.
Therefore, it is better for both the developed and developing countries or investor and
investment recipient states to have an internationally negotiated treaty than accept the often
unbalanced and controversial rulings of investment tribunals of an ad hoc character.
Accordingly, what is needed now is a balancing act that will preserve the regulatory
authority of sovereign States in favor of the environment and human rights when according
protection to foreign investors. Modest efforts seem to be under way within the UN Human
Rights Commission to come up with a set of human rights principles" governing the activities of TNCs, the main agents of foreign investment.76 This perhaps represents a modest
revival within the UN of an attempt to adopt a set of rules to regulate foreign investment
for the greater good of the world.
Indeed, responsible business organizations would prefer to operate under an internationally negotiated set of principles rather than be dependent on ad hoc standards of individual investor recipient states. The adoption of the so-called Equator Principles and the
Global Compact agreed under the auspices of the UN Secretary-General are good examples
of such willingness on the part of responsible business organizations. The idea of a global
comprehensive treaty is no longer a utopian idea. In fact, the Institute for Sustainable
Development has already developed a draft model agreement on the law of foreign invest-
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ment and sustainable development." In addition, the OECD thought it possible to do so
in the past and tried its best.
To conclude, in the absence of a concerted effort to balance the law of foreign investment
with other competing principles of international law, such as the protection and preservation
of the environment and human rights, the world may witness further chaos and confusion
in this area of law in the years to come. What is needed is a comprehensive international
treaty on foreign investment prescribing uniform standards of treatment of foreign investors
in the host countries, and the UN should be the organization to lead the way on this matter.

77.
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